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Soft Power Struggle: Ai Weiwei and the Limits of Sino-
German Cultural Cooperation 
December 15, 2011 in China Around the World by The China Beat 
By Adam Cathcart 
As an attempt to drain the seemingly endless reserves of paranoia fed by China’s rise, the 
extension of Chinese “soft power” [ruan shi li 软实力] into Western Europe is one of the more 
interesting stories of our day. How the Chinese Communist Party uses culture and cultural 
exchange to shape its image in Europe varies, like any good guerrilla strategy, depending on 
conditions. 
In the performing arts, PRC-sponsored groups tour European stages, acting out a meta-drama 
that pits twirling autonomous-region Uighurs against the ubiquitous Falun Gong-affiliated Shen 
Yun ballerinas (and their army of granny pamphleteers). Embassy-sponsored photographic 
exhibits celebrating modernization on the Tibetan plateau contend with high-buck seminars by 
the Dalai Lama. 
And every so often, a man with the slick hair of fifth-generation CCP leadership will turn up in 
Europe to remind his variously enthused and recalcitrant constituents that China’s leaders indeed 
animate culture on the far side of the globe: Witness Xi Jinping in Europe in spring 2010, 
opening museum exhibitions with the Belgian king, or Wen Jiabao’s evident delight in 
announcing “German Culture Year in 2012”. These exertions of soft power in Europe are 
intriguing and significant. They are intertwined with Chinese ascendancy, both in perception and 
hard fact. 
Clearly China can rise peacefully, but can it do so gracefully? 
The latter claim seemed very much in doubt over the eleven weeks which lapsed between the 
April 3 arrest and June 22 release of Ai Weiwei. Ai’s detention, and his ongoing harassment by 
the authorities, calls into question the very basis of China’s soft power strategy in Europe. 
The conventional wisdom has it that the Party was very nervous about Ai’s impact within China 
and that the arrest was primarily about sending a message to intellectuals and dissidents at home. 
Plenty of evidence would appear to support such a view, buttressed further still by fears of the 
tremors from the democracy movements in the Middle East. In an interview with Die Zeit’s 
Angela Kockritz, one anonymous Chinese artist analyzed Ai’s arrest through the prism of 
domestic politics, stating: 
One has to look at the arrest in view of the timing. The National People’s Congress had just 
ended, and many young politicians assumed new posts. Their predecessors had left Ai Weiwei in 
peace, because they treasured his father [patriotic poet Ai Qing]. The new generation wants to 
signal that this protection no longer exists. [“Ausserst nervoes: Ein Besuch in Ai Weiweis 
Kuenstlerdorf,” Die Zeit, 7 April 2001] 
But no less than a new cadre’s shot across the bow, Ai’s arrest was also made to function within 
the matrix of the CCP’s cultural-political strategy toward Europe, and became a point of 
significant tension within Sino-German relations. The ongoing exchanges and underground tug-
of-war between Germany and China, those two economic and cultural leviathans, continues, but 
the case of Ai Weiwei (“der Fall Ai Weiwei”) brought about what can only be called a 
diplomatic-cultural crisis in Sino-German relations and prompted a number of calls to examine 
the effectiveness of soft power deployed by both sides. 
Ai Weiwei and Germany 
The levels of heroism and notoriety enjoyed by Ai in the West are particularly broad and deep in 
the German media. Before his detention and eventual charges on tax fraud, Ai had become a 
ubiquitous presence in Germany. His acerbic critiques of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 
Wenchuan earthquake, internet censorship, architectural practice, and a host of other issues, 
rapidly elevated him in Germany to the status of China’s foremost dissident, an artist-
provocateur who also happened to have a large footprint in Germany. Thus, German writers, 
artists and casual observers of the Chinese scene had celebrated Ai’s output of exhibitions, 
interviews, and would-be spark-to-prairie-fire blog posts. After all, he was an artist attempting to 
free himself from the fetters of a totalizing state, an endeavor with historical resonance in 
Germany. Ai Weiwei became, in so far as the newspapers were concerned, a man of singular 
stature and moral weight, comparable in a sense to the limited number of incorruptible and 
principled intellectuals who had resisted both the blandishments and the torments of the Nazi 
system and then the German Democratic Republic. 
Certainly Ai never held back in his German-language interviews: 
Heinrich Bork, “Chinese Artist Ai Weiwei: ‘He Who Lives in a Dictatorship Must Resist’,” 
Suddeutscher Zeitung, 16 September 2009. 
SZ: How common is it for people in China to be hit by police? 
Ai: Every day, maybe every second. When they want to oppress you, they often hit you a second 
time. Some people resist arrest, and on that account they have their legs broken. Others are 
confined in “guesthouses” which function like a dangerous prison. This year the Chinese 
Communist Party celebrates the 60th anniversary of our state. They revel in their own radiance 
[Sie sonnt sich in ihrem eigenen Glanz]. But all fairness, all justice is sacrificed to this system. 
Ai’s beating in Chengdu in 2009 and his subsequent rush to Munich for surgery, the exposure to 
his own blood raised the level of authenticity, self-awareness, and ideas (already well established 
for a European audience) of the artist as a kind of martyr for self-expression and human rights in 
China, indicate that the artist had inherited the core of these contrarian characteristics from his 
father, the poet Ai Qing, in whose Resistance War poetry the notion of a bloody-browed and 
laughing defiance was prefigured. 
His reception in Germany being so warm, Ai voiced a desire to set up a base camp in Berlin, 
even as, in November 2009, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs was handling rumors of an 
investigation into Ai’s finances. Ai’s response at the time was to deflect it all as theater and revel 
in the adulation from Germany, publishing puff pieces in Munich about his chef, a man for 
whom “cooking is like calligraphy…[or] sleeping; one doesn’t need to learn how.” However, in 
the weeks before his arrest, it seems Ai had premonitions that his grace period was up, as related 
to Heinrik Bork of the Sudddeutscher Zeitung in the last documented interview before his 
detention. 
Ai Weiwei and the “Art of the Enlightenment” Exhibit 
When Ai was finally detained amid the modernist arches of the Beijing Capital Airport, he was 
en route, eventually, to Germany, and sat but a few hundred meters away from German Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle. Westerwelle, too, was on his way back to Berlin after successfully 
inaugurating the much-celebrated “Art of the Enlightenment” exhibition at the newly renovated 
National Museum. The exhibition, a tour de force of German humanism and the roots of 
European democratic thought, seemed to signal a renewed openness, even in the context of the 
CCP’s recent crackdowns on dissent. Nearly seven years planning had gone into this Kantian 
Aufschwung, involving cultural contacts on the highest level. If there were ever a Trojan horse to 
stride up the steps near Tiananmen Square after 1989, this was surely it. 
With Ai’s disappearance, the question of German galleries pulling out of the exhibit was raised 
immediately in the German press. This was hardly a new debate: at the Frankfurt Book Fair in 
2009, spectacle and invitations had also at stake and the confrontation over cultural matters and 
human rights remained unresolved. Museum directors began to muse openly about bringing the 
Enlightenment exhibition back home to Germany, and German elites wondered how China 
would make its “German Culture Year in 2012″ anything other than a farce. (There are only so 
many times, one article noted, that the Chinese axiom “the path is the goal” can rescue one from 
a dead-end process.) Berlin summoned the Chinese ambassador to issue a rebuke, but no 
contracts, or exhibitions, were cancelled as a result. 
There followed in Germany the usual stable of statements by legislators, defenders of human 
rights, and defenders of dialogue, contrasted with conspicuous silence from economic interests. 
At Tacheles, a 798-like art space—itself a monument to technology built in the 1920s, occupied 
by the SS, bombed in the war, and picked up again as a magnet for free-thinking and -inhaling 
Berlin left wingers after 1990, now threatened by wealthy developers—someone pinned up a 
flyer urging people to call the Chinese Embassy in Berlin, ask “Where is Weiwei?” and hang up. 
The Chinese government was largely silent, employing a strategy of letting adversaries vent and 
subsequently fragment themselves was generous to the CCP. 
The CCP’s press responses quickly took on a pedagogical intent. As in the case of Liu Xiaobo’s 
Nobel Prize ceremony, where Beijing demanded that countries skip the ceremony, the CCP 
seemed to be using its punishment of an intellectual figure as a means of reinforcing the image of 
the Party-State’s imperviousness to foreign critique. For the CCP, the desired result perhaps, was 
foreign opprobrium itself, which—a story was sufficiently spread via oral rumor, then 
acknowledged and redigested by such leading organs as the Huanqiu Shibao—could be fed into 
the nationalistic echo chamber of the Chinese internet, thus reminding netizens that external 
criticism of China’s path forward is not simply unfair, but part of the larger topos of international 
conspiracy meant to keep China down at any cost. 
After biding its time, or after receiving permission to comment from the Propaganda Ministry, on 
April 16, Huanqiu Shibao placed its article the uproar about Ai Weiwei in a prominent position 
on its website. In China, a handful of government-approved Netizen comments on the story (they 
have since been scrubbed away completely) summed up the preferred response nicely: 
Who is Ai Weiwei? 
What is “Der Spiegel”? 
If the West supports it, we must oppose it. 
The same countries that criticize us now were part of the 8-power intervention [of 1900]… 
Ever since the Opium War… 
Ultimately, it appeared that Germany’s economic needs would take primacy over its ability to 
take a principled stand against Ai’s detention. Articles published in the Berlin Tagesspiegel 
raged against Germany’s inability to elevate human rights over trade, describing Germany’s total 
impotence in the case of Ai. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was put in the rather 
uncomfortable position of having to deny Der Spiegel reports that she had actually called for the 
release of Ai Weiwei. When Wen Jiabao arrived in Berlin in June, Merkel began their meetings 
at a Wannsee villa that had once belonged to an artist persecuted by the Nazis. This beautiful bit 
of political theater was completely lost on the Chinese audience: as the Frankfurt Allegemeine 
Zeitung ruefully noted, the Chinese media was treating Wen Jiabao’s state visit to Germany—the 
largest CCP delegation to ever visit Berlin—as no more important than a side trip to Kazakhstan. 
In the battle for public opinion over Ai Weiwei, China had may have lost in Germany, but the 
Chinese state was never particularly interesting in debating the case, and, apart from a few 
evocative banners hung at Berlin galleries, its cultural ties with German institutions did not 
appear to suffer. While the Chinese state’s self-descriptions are so often suffused with narratives 
of humiliation, it appears that the slap had been inflicted mainly upon Germany, at Westerwelle’s 
opening of the Enlightenment exhibit, without any successful retort. The German Foreign 
Minister must indeed have leaned back in his Lufthansa chair, looked out into the murky skies, 
and returned home, leaving his country’s treasures, and the muzzled provocateur, behind in 
Beijing. 
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